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COMMENTS
FREEDOM

OF SPEECH: FACT OR FICTION?

... our liberty depends on our freedom of the mind and
that cannot be limited without being lost." Jefferson.

During and following every war, restrictions on the individual's basic
rights are the prevailing trend. \Vorld War I saw thousands of prosecutions
under the Sedition Act ' and state criminal syndicalism statutes. 2 All convictions under these acts called only for an indictment, and the patriotic

zeal of the jury did the rest.3 World War II has been no except ion,4i-congressional investigations of various organizations are a comnmon occurrence,
public employees must sign non-communist affidavits and. as was recently
observed in the Peekskill incident, a leftist meeting was turned into an open
riot by nunerous veteran's organizations who decided that the preservation
of the ideals of this country rested in their discretion. This problem faced the
United States Supreme Court recently in the case of Terminiello v.Chicago.6
Terminiello, a disciple of Gerald L. K. Smith, was convicted for the use
of "fighting words" 6 while addressing an audience sponsored by the Christian
Veterans of America. The trial record showed that over 1000 persons picketed
the hall and that some threw brickbats and stink bombs, broke windows, and
rushed police lines. In his opening remarks. Father Terminiello said
Now. I am going to whisper my greetings to you, Fellow Christians.
I will interpret it. I said, 'Fellow Christians,' and I suppose there are
somne of the scum got in by mistake, so I want to tell a story about the
scin: . . . And nothing I could say tonight could7 begin to express the
contempt for the slimy scum that got in by mistake.
1. 40 STAT. 217 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 33 (1917) ; Carroll, Freedom of Speech and
of the Press in War Time: The Sedition Act, 17 Mt H. L. Ray. 621 (1919) ; Carroll,
Freedom of Speech and of the Press in the Federalist Period: The Sedition Act, 18
MIcH. L. Rv. 615 (1920), 32 HARV. L. REv. 417 (1919).
2.Comment, 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 390 (1936).
3.Chafee, Freedom of Speech in Vartime, 39 HARV. L.REv. 932 (1919) ; Comments,
90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 598 (1942), 51 YALE L. J.798 (1942).
4. O'Brian, Restraints Upon Individual Freedom in Times of National Emergency,
26 CoaN. L. Q. 523.
5. 69 Sup. Ct. 894 (1949).
6. Chaplinsky v.New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 572 (1942) (fighting words include the lewd and obscene, the profane. the libelous-those which by their very utterance
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace) :cf. State v.O'Donnell,
16 N. J. Misc. 393, 200 Ati. 739 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (use of word "scum," breach of peace),
State v. Christie, 97 Vt. 461, 123 At. 849 (1924) (use of words "rats, scabs," breach of
peace). Contra: People v. Downer, 6 N. Y. S.2d 566 (N. Y. City Mag. Ct. 1938)
(distribution of anti-semitic literature in Jewish district. not disorderly conduct).
7. Supra note 5 at 901.
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Evidence showed that this speech stirred the atudience not only to cheer and
applaud, but also to remonstrations of anger, unrest, and alarm. For the use of
these so-called "fighting words" 8 he was arrested and convicted for violation
of an ordinance by the use of language tending toward a breach of the peace
and fined $100.00. In successive appeals to the Illinois Court of Appeals 9
and the Supreme Court of Illinois,' 0 the conviction was upheld.
Terminiello appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the grounds
that the ordinance" was an abridgment of the right to speak tinder the First 12
and Fourteenth' s Amendments. The trial court charged in construing the
ordinance' 4 that, "breach of the peace consists of any misbehavior which
violates the public peace and decorum, and that the misbehavior may constitute
a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute; brings
about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the
inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm." 1
Though no writ of error was taken on the validity of this jury charge, the
court 11 chose to look beyond the writ and reversed on the ground that this
jury charge was beyond the meaning of free speech as defined by the "clear
and present danger" rule, and was in itself unconstitutional. 7 While the
Court did not directly hold that Terminiello's words were within the realm
of protected speech, the majority opinion in defending itself from a vigorous
dissent by Justice Jackson 8 attempted to define what utterances the court
shall protect:
a function of free speech under our system of governmlent is to invite

dispute. It tnay indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger. 19
In substance, the court opined that free speech should only be sacrificed when
the interests of public safety are really imperiled, and not when it is barely
conceivable that they may be somewhat affected.
In order to more fully appreciate and appraise this decision, it is necessary
to re-examine the past cases involving freedom of speech, press, religion and
8.§ 1 (1), ch. 193, Rev. Code 1939, City of Chicago: All persons who shall make,
aid, countenance, or assist in making any improper noise, riot, disturbance, breach of
the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace, within the limits of the city ...
shall be deemed guilty of disorderly conduct, and upon conviction thereof, shall be
severally fined not less than one dollar nor more than two hundred for each offense.
9. Chicago v. Terminiello, 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E.2d 45 (1947).
10. Chicago v. Terminiello, 400 Ill. 23, 79 N. E.2d 39 (1948).
11. See note 8 supra.
12. U. S. CONsT. A,%r.xn 1.
13. U. S. CONST. AMEND IV, § 1.
14, See note 8 supra.
15. Supra note 5 at 895.
16. See note 5 supra.
17. See 4 MIAMI L. Q. 120 (1949).
18. Supra note 5 at 899.
19. Sispra note 5 at 896.

COIMMEENTS
assembly, beginning with Schenck v. U. S.,20 wherein Mr. Justice Holmes
laid down the standard whereby these freedoms may be limited-the "clear
and present danger" test.
II
The Sedition Act. 2' passed by Congress during World War I, made
it unlawful to advocate the overthrow of the government, and to interfere
with conscription or the war effort. It would seem that the purpose of this
statute was to punish for the commission of acts, and not for the were use of
words which tend toward the fulfillment of these prohibited acts. 22 However
in upholding the conviction of Schenck, 23 who violated the Act by publishing
a circular urging men not to obey the Conscription Statute, the Court in a
unanimous opinion through Mr. Justice Holines announced the following
as a guide in ascertaining when one's speech could he lawfully limited without
violating the First Amendment:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man
in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . . The question
in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will

bring about the substantial evil that Congress had a right to prevent. It
is a question of proximity and degree.2 4 (Italics added).
This test was reaffirmed as applied to other cases involving Sedition Statute
the same year in the Debs2 and Frohwerk 26 cases, but the latter part of 1919
and the year 1920 found a change in Holmes' attitude regarding what speech
27
should come within the sphere of his "clear and present danger" formula.
Realizing that the Schenck 28 decision immediately followed a horrible struggle between the nations of the world, and that even the steadiness of the
judiciary might have been undermined, Justices Holmes and Brandeis vigorously dissented in the Abranms,2 9 Schaeffer"0 and Gilbert l cases, and at20. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
21. See note 1 supra.

22.
23.
24.
25.
Act by
26.

Chafee, Freedom of Speech in WVartime, 32 HAM'. L. REv. 932, 953 (1919).
See note 20 supra.
Supra note 20 at 52.
Debs v. U. S., 249 U. S. 211 (1919) (defendant convicted of violating Sedition
making speeches against conscription).
Frohwerk v. U. S., 249 U. S. 204 (1919) (companion case to Debs v. U. S.).

27. See note 20 supra.
28. Supra.
29. Abrams v. U. S., 250 U. S. 616 (1919) (defendant published pamphlets denouncing the war and urging workers to strike) ; Chafee, A Contemporary State Trial-The United States v. Jacob Abram's, 33 HA'. L. Rnv. 747 (1920) and Corwin, Freedom
of Speech and Press Under the First Amendment: A Risum, 30 YALE L. J. 48 (1920)
(pro and con discussion of the Abram's case); Wigmore, Abrams v. U. S.: Freedom
of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in Wartime and Peacetime, 14 ILL. L. Rn'. 539
(1920) ; Comments, 33 H.xv. L. Rnv. 442 (1920), 14 ILL. L. Rev, 601 (1920).
30. Schaeffer v. U. S., 251 U. S. 466 (1920) (defendant's newspaper misquoted
material concerning the war effort which was damaging to morale).
31. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 (1920) (defendant made speeches agailnst
conscription).
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tempted to set forth a more practical guide by which to apply the "clear and
present danger" doctrine:
.. . like many other rules for human conduct, it (the clear and present
danger rule] can be applied correctly only by the exercise of good judgment;
and to the exercise of good judgment, calmness is, in times of deep feeling
and on 2subjects which excite passion, as essential as fearlessness and
honesty.
The two dissenters again were presented the opportunity to express
their views in the oft-cited Gitlow"3 case, where the defendant was convicted
of violating a New York statute which made unlawful the use of certain
language even though the immediate execution of the thought expressed
therein was not advocated. Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, refusing
to hold one liable for the bad tendency of words, declaring that fear is worse
than repression. Four years later in the Whitney"4 case, these two Justices
still found themselves among the minority on the question as to what constitutes protected speech, although they concurred specially because of a
procedural defect.
Whitney was a member of the Communist Party, membership in which
was held to be a violation of the state criminal syndicalism statute. In attempting to gain acceptance for their views the distinguished liberals stated, "It
there be time, to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert
the evil [infringement upon free speech] by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." "1 These views
soon gained recognition in the Fiske al case, when the majority of the court
in a similar situation reconsidered its previous position and refused to convict
for violation of a criminal syndicalism statute merely because of membership
in certain organizations which espouse other systems of government. This
liberal tendency was continued into the early thirties by the outlawing of other
forms of discriminatory legislation. 7

32. Supra note 30 at 482.
33. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1923) ; Comments, 36 HAstv. L. REv. 199
(1922), 20 ILL, L. REv. 809 (1920), 4 U. or CINN. L. REv. 211 (1930), 9 U. or CINN.
L. Rv. 265 (1935).
34. Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) ; Comments, 22 .i.. L. R'. 541
,(1928), 14 VA. L. REv. 49 (1927).
35. Id. at 377.

36. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927) ; Covington, The Dynamic American Bill

of Rights, 26 CAN. B. REv. 638 (1948) ; Willis, Freedom of Speech anid of the Press,
4 mND. L. J. 445 (1929) ; Comment, 41 11AMv. L. Rzv. 525 (1928).
37. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931) (prior restraint on publication unconstitutional) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931) (statute which prohibited
saluting of red flag unconstitutional) ; cf. People v. Burman, 154 Micii. 150, 117 N. W.
589 (1908). Contra: People v. Immonen, 271 Mich. 384, 261 N. W. 59 (1935); Cathcart.
Constitutional Freedom of Speech and of the Press, 21 A. B A. J. 595 (1935).

COMMENTS
With the advent of the Roosevelt court the protection of minorities and
civil liberties was accentuated. One of the leading cases at the beginning of this
era was DeJonge v. Oregon.8 8 Defendant was convicted under a criminal
syndicalism statute for being a member of the Communist Party and speaking
at an orderly rally wherein new members were solicited. In reversing the conviction the Court held that peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot
be made a crime. In order to determine if the bounds of free speech are exceeded, one must look to the utterance of the speaker and not to the character
of the group sponsoring the meeting. This case was followed in Hendron v.
Lowry,, 0 where a paid Negro communist organizer was found guilty of
violating a statute which made it a crime to incite to riot. In holding the
application of the statute in this instance to be an unwarranted invasion of the
right to free expression, the Court declared that the power of the state to
abridge freedom of speech and assembly is the exception rather than the rule,
and that in order to penalize the utterance of certain words, the legislature
must find reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government.
Beginning with Lovell v. City of Griffin,4 0 application ot the "clear and
present danger" test was extended from cases involving threats to organized
government to the broader field of civil liberties, including distribution of
religious literature, 42 parades,4" picketing, 4 ' breach of peace, 4" contempt by

38 299 U. S. 353 (1937) ; 46 YALE L. J. 862 (1937).
39. 301 U. S. 242 (1937); 34 CoL. L. REv. 1357 (1934); 35 MIcH. L. REv. 1373
(1937).
40. 303 U. S. 444 (1938) (Lovell was convicted of distributing religious literature
without first obtaining a permit, In reversing the conviction the court held that liberty
of circulation is essential to freedom of expression, and without a means of expounding
one's theological views, the right granted by the Constitution is nothing more than an
empty gesture).
41. Johnson, A Study of Supreme Court Attitudes, 1 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 192
(1940).
42. See note 40 supra; Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) (payment of license tax held not a prerequisite to dissemination of religious literature);
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943) (ordinance which requires securement
of a permit prior to the distribution of religious literature held not a proper exercise
of the police power when the purpose was to prevent the disturbance of local citizens;
judgment of the community should not be substituted for judgment of the individuals) ;
8 BiOOKLYN L. IREv. 236 (1938); 8 Gso. WAsH L. REV. 866 (1940); Contra: Jones
v. City of Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942) (Murphy dissenting, stating that freedom of
religion should not be limited to those with means).
43. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
44. Carpenter's and Joiner's Union of America, Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U. S. 722 (1942); American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941); Milk
Wagon Driver's Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (1941); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) ; Fienberg, Picketing, Free Speech and "Labor Disputes,"
17 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 385 (1939); Comments, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 572 (1942), 15 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 241 (1940), 48 YALE L. J. 54 (1936).
45. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296 (1940); 22 B. U. L. Rav. 446 (1942).
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publication, 46 use of amplification devices, 47 flag saluting, 45 and lawful public
9
assemblage.'
The court in applying the "clear and present danger" test in (he much
publicized Hague50 case, recognized the necessity of integrating freedom of
assembly with freedom of speech. This decision in effect overruled 51 a long
series of cases beginning with Davis v. 3iassachusctsS-S 2 which upheld the
municipalities' right to limit public assemnblies upon public property. Mayor
Hague had passed a vague and indefinite ordinance which prohibited public
gatherings if a disturbance of the peace was likely to occur. In affirming the
Circuit Court of Appeals decision" that the statute was unconstitutional and
an infringement upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court4
declared that no principle could be more destructive of free speech than to
judge the permissibility of a public meeting by any standard of its popularity.
The right to hold unpopular meetings and to express dissenting opinions is
of the essence of American liberty. The only way to safeguard open discussion
is to value freedom of expression in all its forms so highly as never to practice
or permit any interference with it. It is the duty of every municipality to
make the right of free assembly prevail over forces of disorder, as any other
result will allow one group to place a prior restraint upon another by creating
a disturbance of the peace. A year later in a picketing case55 the Court put
into words its extension of the "clear and present danger" rule when it stated
that:
. . Abridgement of the liberty of such discussion can be justified only
where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.56
'rotection under the "clear and present danger" rule was next extended
46. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U. S.

252 (1941).

47. Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 Sup. Ct. 448 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U. S. 558
(1948).
48. West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943); faylor

v. Mississippi, 319 U. S. 583 (1943).
49. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) ; Sellers
v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877 (C. C. A. 8th 1947) ; Danskin v. San Diego Unified School

District, 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 F.2d 885 (1946).
50. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496 (1939) ; Clark,

Municipal Regulation of Outdoor Public Assembly, 25 A. B. A. J. 741 (1939) ; Heller,
Freedom of Assembly, 25 MARQ. L. Rev. 1 (1940); Comment, 17 Micn. L. REv. 609
(1939): 52 HARv. L. Rev. 320 (1938); 33 ILL. L. Rnv. 845 (1939); 14 ST. JoHN's L. REv.

157 (1938).
51. Fraenkel, Oj Hundred and Fifvty Years of the Rill of Rights, 23

MINN.

L. Riv.

719 (1939) ; 25 A. B. A. J. 7 (1939).
52. 167 U. S. 43 (1897).

53. See note 50 supra.
54. Ibid.
55. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) ; Comment, 28
(1940).
56. Id. at 104.

CALIF.

L. REV. 733

COMMENTS
to the dissemination of religious literature by various minority groups.5 7 To
this end the majority of the Court has stringently examined local legislation
which requires the procurement of a permit as a condition precedent to distribution of printed matter, and concluded that free communication of views
may only be suppressed when there is a "clear and present danger" to the
public peace and tranquility and not under the guise of conserving desirable
conditions.Y5
The present day conception of the Holmes formula was finally spelled
out in 1941 .9 After an excellent discussion and development of the "clear and
present danger" test, Mr. Justice Black laid down the following definition
of this tried and accepted principle:
What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger" cases is
a working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be puin-

ished. Those cases do not purport to make the furthermost constitutional
boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than
recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First
Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging the
freedom of speech, or the press'. It must be taken as a command of the
broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-loving
society. will allow .

.

. neither 'inherent tendency' nor 'reasonable tendency'

is enough to justify a restriction of free expression. 0 (Italics added.)

As further evidence of its intent to follow this new standard in cases involving
restrictions on one's basic rights, the Court in Hart9ell v. U. S.31 acquitted
the defendant of the same sedition act under which so many citizens were
note 40
supra.
- 57.
58. See
Cantwell
v. Connecticut,
310 U. S. 296 (1940) ; People v. Northum, 41 Cal. App.2d
219, 106 P.2d 433 (1940) ; State ex rel. Singelton v. Woodruff. 153 Fla. 84. 13 So.2d 704
(1943); accord, Stapleton v. Mitchell. Atty. Gen., 60 F. Supp. 51 (D. Kan. 1945) (statute
unconstitutional which required payment of license fee for union organizers) ; Io re
Whitney, 57 Cal. App.2d 167, 134 P.2d 516 (1943) (ordinance requiring securement of
permit before making a speech unconstitutional) ; Trujillo v. City of Walsenburg, 108
Colo. 427, 118 P-2d 1081 (1941) (ordinance requiring permit to hold parade unconstitutional as too arbitrary) ; cf. People v. Kieran, 26 N. Y. S.2d 291 (Nassau County Court
1940) (this and the following three cases upheld the rights of Jehovah's Witnesses to
solicit membership through public parades, playing of phonographs, speaking against flagsaluting, and playing of loudspeaker) ; Zimmerman v. State, 77 Crim. App. 374, 141 P.2d
809 (Okla. 1943) ; Miller v. State, 75 Crim. App. 428, 133 P.2d 223 (Okla. 1943) ; State
v. Langston, 195 S. C. 190, 11 S. E.2d 1 (1940). But cf. Fitts v. City of Atlanta, 121 Ga.
567,49 S. E. 793 (1905) (conviction for making speech without permit upheld) ; Watters v.
City of Indianapolis, 191 Ind, 671, 134 N. E. 482 (1922) (ordinance prohibiting display by
person in public of any banner, sign, etc., not violation of free speech) ; Almassi v. City of
Newark, 8 N. J. Misc. 420, 150 Atl. 217 (C. P. 1930) (conviction for distributing circulars
on public road without permit upheld) ; City of Buffalo v. Till, 192 App. Div. 99, 182 N. Y.
Supp. 418 (4th Dept. 1920) ; City of Duquesne v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112, 112 At. 130
(1920). Contra: Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N. E. 224 (1889); City
of Washburn v. Ellquist, 242 Wis. 609, 9 N. W.2d 121 (1943).
59. Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941) (conviction of contempt by publication reversed) ; 45 MicH. L. REv. 513 (1947).
60. Id. at 263.
61. 322 U. S. 680 (1940) ; cf. Dunne v. U. S., 138 F.2d 137 (C. C. A. 8th 1943) (defendants convicted under 1941 federal statute similar to Sedition Act-54 Stat. 670 (1940),
18 U. S. C. A. §§ 9-11 (Supp. 1948).

MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
deprived of their liberty during World War I. Soon afterwards the high
tribunal refused to hold a labor organizer guilty of violating a statute which
made all labor organizers register before soliciting membership. They opined
that in order to determine what boundary governs where the individual's
freedom ends and the state's power begins, one must look to the character of
the right, not to the limitation. Any attempt to restrict one's liberties must
be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely,
but by clear and present danger. 2
Again in 1946, the Court positively asserted its stand on personal liberties.6 3 In reversing the contempt conviction of a newspaper editor for interfering with the administration of justice. the Court held that whether you
use the words clear and present or grave and immediate danger, or real and
substantial threat, the question is always one of balancing the desirability of
free discussion against the necessity for a fair adjudication of justice, and in
all borderline cases, freedom of speech should weigh heavily. The doors of
permissible public comment should be hesitantly closed for they are selflocking. When you close these doors you throw the key away and the only
way to open them is by force.
II1
How then does this discussion and development of the "clear and present
danger" test apply to the facts at hand in the case of Father Terminiello?
Was his speech within the redefined area of protected freedom of expression?
As enunciated in the Bridges6 4 case, speech may not be restrained, unless
the substantial evil to be avoided is extremely serious. The danger to have
been eluded in the instant case was the imminent threat of mob violence, both
within and without the auditorium. However, an examination of the record
reveals that all, or nearly all, of the parties present were aware of the principles of the sponsoring Christian Veterans of America and their keynote
speaker, Terminiello. An intent to hold a private and peaceful assembly was
manifested by the requirement of invitations to gain admittance, though the
method employed in their distribution was haphazard. 65 While there were
several of the hostile faction within range of Terminiello's vile remarks, the
vast multitude of his antagonistic opponents were outside of the hall and beyond hearing distance. This latter group were themselves guilty of breaching
the peace before Terminiello ever uttered his defamatory statement, in fact
62. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S.516 (1945).
63. Pennekamp v. State of Florida, 328 U. S. 331 (1946); Comment, 41 111. L. Rev.

690 (1947); Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367 (1947)

(cites Pennekamp and Bridges

cases); Graham v. Jones, 200 La. 137, 7 So.2d 688 (1942). Contra; Francis v. Virgin

Islands, 11 F.2d 860 (C. C. A. 3d 1926).
64. See note 59 supra.

65. Chicago v. Terminiello, 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E.2d 45 (1947)

opinion).

(dissenting

COMMENTS
before he even appeared at the scene. Who then was guilty of provoking the
6
substantialevil which the courts have the duty to prevent under the Bridges"
definition of the "clear and present danger" dictate? It would seem that
rather than chastising the speaker, such situations demand vigorous measures
against the opposition. As was reasoned in a recent write-up of the instant
case, "if the police are unable to manage opportunistic trouble-making, free
speech rights are meaningless." 87
The main contention of the strongly worded minority opinion is that
the effect of this decision is to strip a municipality of its police power and
manner of maintaining the public order and decorum. In support of this
view Mr. Justice Jackson expounded:
The choice is not between order and liberty. It is between liberty with
order and anarchy without either. There is danger that, if the Court does
not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact. e5
But this view not only contemplates limiting free speech when two opposing
ideologies clash, but enables one faction to deprive the other of its basic
right to freedom of assembly. Without the right of assembly, guarantees of
free speech are empty gestures, since if no public forum is available, the right
to speak freely is of little or no consequence. Professor Chafee's thoughts on
this subject might well be called in as a rebuttal to Mr. Justice Jackson's fears,
"The state must meet violence with violence

. . .

but against opinious agitation,

bombastic threats, it has another weapon-language. Words as such should
be fought with their own kind, and force called in against them only to head
off violence when that is sure to follow the utterances before there is a chance
for counter-argument." 69

'NT
Ever since Holmes decision in the Davis7O case, the right to freely assemble has been more narrowly construed than the other freedoms.7 ' In
upholding the right of a city to regulate the use of public property under their
police power, Holmes failed to recognize the interdependent relationship of
freedom of assembly to freedom of thought. 2 It seems reasonable that the
66. See note 59 supra.
67. Comment, 16 U. Cut. L. Rev. 328, 332 (1949).
68. Supra note 5 at 911.
69. Chafee, A Contemporary State Trial-The United States v. Jacob Abram's,
33 Hiatv. L. REv. 747, 773 (1920).

70. See note 52 supra.

71. Jarrett, Mund, The Right of Assem:bly, 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 1 (1931) ; Stamps,
Freedom of Assembly, 11 KAN. CITY L. RFv. 187 (1943) ; Comment, 47 VAL% L. J. 405
(1938).
72. See Justice Pound, dissenting, People v. Atwell, 232 N. Y. 96, at 104, 133 N. E.
364, at 367 (1921). Comment, 42 HAv. L. REv. 265 (1928).
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state under its police power should act in behalf of the health, safety, welfare,
and morals of its citizens, but in doing so it should not restrict their inalienable rights; for the police power is subservient to these rights. 7' Thus the
DavisT4 case, in instituting controls on these inalienable rights, but neglecting
to provide means to combat an arbitrary or discriminatory ex'ercise of police
5
power. greatly exceeded constitutional boundaries.7
It was not until the Hague" case that freedom of assembly was restored
as cognate to the privilege of free speech. Two very recent cases which reiterate this principle are, Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District "
and Sellers v. Johnson.7T In the latter case, the district court " upheld the
right of a municipality to refuse to issue a permit to hold a meeting where
there was fear of mob violence, basing their decision on the "clear and present
danger" test. The Circuit Court of Appealsso in reversing and upholding the
right of assemblage said: "The fundamental right to assemble, to speak, and
to worship cannot be abridged merely because persons threaten to stage a riot
or because peace officers believe or are afraid that breaches of the peace will
occur if the rights are exercised. If this were possible unpopular groups might
find themselves virtually inarticulate." "i Although the Danskin8 2 case is
distinguishable on its facts, wherein the defendant was refused the use of a
public auditorium because he was unwilling to sign an affidavit stating that
he was not in favor of the violent overthrow of the government, the court
followed the liberal view set forth in the Bridges8 3 and Haguel4 cases. The
San Diego School District was enjoined from prohibiting Danskin the use
of the auditorium, the court reasoning that the very nature of a democracy
implies a right on the part of its residents to peaceably assemble for the discussion of public affairs. As early as 1882 85 it was recognized that municipal
officers have no authority to ban a lawful assemblage on the ground that the
views to be there expressed are so ullpopular that rioting may occur. If lawless elements in the community choose to resort to riot rather than ignoring
such propaganda or meeting it by sound argunment, it is the duty of the
police to protect the lawful assemblage and to repress those who unlawfully
attack it. One legal writer remarked that in the long run the public order
73. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
74. See note 52 supra.
75. Comment, 23 CALMF. L. RE'. 180 (1935).

76. See note 50 supra.
77. 28 Cal.2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946); Comment, 26 NEB. L. RE.v. 416 (1947)

35 CALua. L. REv. 120 (1947).
78. 163 F.2d 877 (C. C.'A. 8th 1947), reversing 69 F.
61 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1948) ; 27 NED. L. Rrv. 437 (1948).
79. 69 F. Supp. 778 (S. D. Ia. 1946).
80. 163 F.2d 877 (C. C. A. 8th 1947).
81. Id. at 881.
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83. See note 59 supra.
84. See note 50 supra.
85. Beatty v. Gillbanks, 9 Q. B. 1). 308 (1882).
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may best be served by risking a little disorder: "To let off steam may scorch
the ceiling; it does not blow off the roof." sc Since freedom of speech cannot
be interfered with by direct legislation, freedom of assembly should find this
same protection from prior restraint.8 7
V
That society must be preserved is the tenet upon which the "clear and
present danger" rule rests. But surely we, whose heritage is the unorthodox
origin of our society, should realize that the validity of this contention is de-

pendent upon the nature of the society involved. The American concept of
society is one of self-government which provides the people almost unlimited
liberty to peaceably bring about changes. Few would deny that this is a form
of government worthy of protection. But self-government, to be preserved,
requires that those to whom it belongs be able to exchange and consider ideas
as freely as those to whom they delegate the power to act.88 Thus it would
seem that the right of the government to preserve society, though necessary
to the continued existence of the right to free speech, is subservient to it.
This ideal has been well stated by Mr. Justice Holmes, the "Great Dissenter,"
who in his usual role said:
. . . if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively

calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not
free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that
we hate.6 9
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but note that this is not meant to imply that the immunity from libel and slander actions
granted to Congress should be extended to the public, id. at 18.
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